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Comments
THE LONELINESS OF THE LONG DISTANCE
STATUTE, THE ALIEN TORT CLAIMS ACT,
28 U.S.C. § 1350
Section 1350 of Title 28 of the United States Code1 grants to the fed-
eral district courts subject matter jurisdiction 2 over civil actions brought
by an alien for a tort committed in violation of the law of nations or a
treaty of the United States. Although the wording of the statute has re-
mained almost unchanged since its first enactment in 1789,1 very few re-
ported decisions have interpreted section 1350." In just three of these de-
cisions did a court retain jurisdiction of a claim brought under section
1350 or one of its predecessors.5 The scanty case law interpreting section
1 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1976). Section 1350 states that "[t]he district courts shall have orig-
inal jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the
law of nations or a treaty of the United States." Id.
I Subject matter jurisdiction in the federal courts is based on the character of the par-
ties, on the nature of the controversy, or on both. See United States v. California, 328 F.2d
729, 734 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 817 (1964). Section 1350 is an example of a juris-
dictional statute based both on the character of the parties and on the nature of the contro-
versy, because § 1350 requires that the plaintiff be an alien and that the controversy involve
a tort committed in violation of international law. Id. Section 1350 grants jurisdiction with-
out regard to the amount in controversy requirement of the diversity and federal question
statutes, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332. See Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 549-50
n.17 (1972).
' The original version of § 1350 was passed by the first Congress in the Judiciary Act of
1789. 1 Stat. 73, 77 (1789). When federal statutes were codified in 1876, the original version
of § 1350 was modified slightly and reenacted. 18 No. 1 Stat. 94, 96 (1875). Section 1350 was
also modified and reenacted in two later recodifications. 36 Stat. 1087, 1093 (1911); 62 Stat.
869, 934 (1948). The most notable change in the statute was the elimination of language
which stated that the grant of federal jurisdiction was to be concurrent with the jurisdiction
of the states. Compare 1 Stat. 73, 77 (1789) with 18 No. 1 Stat. 94, 96 (1875). Because of the
elimination of the concurrent jurisdiction language, some commentators have stated that §
1350 operates as an exclusive grant of jurisdiction, depriving the states of jurisdiction over
claims falling within the terms of § 1350. E.g., F. DAWSON & I. HEAD, INTERNATIONAL LAW
NATIONAL TRMUNALS AND THE RIGHTS OF ALIENS 128 (1971). See also Chapalain Compagnie
v. Standard Oil Co. (Indiana), 467 F. Supp. 181, 182 (N.D. Illt 1978) (counsel argued 28
U.S.C. § 1441 removal improper because federal court did not have exclusive jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and § 1350). However, the elimination of the concurrent jurisdiction
language cannot support the contention that § 1350 is exclusive. The rule of construction is
that the federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction only where it is explicitly reserved by
statute. L. HENKIN, FoREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONsTrruTON 206 (1972) [hereinafter cited as
HENKIN). No case law exists which supports the contention that § 1350 is a grant of exclu-
sive jurisdiction.
" See Annot., 34 A.L.R. FED. 388, 391 (1977).
5 See Filartiga v. Pena-Iraa, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980); Abdul-Rahman Omar Adra v.
Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857 (D. Md. 1961); Bolchos v. Darrel, 3 F. Cas. No. 1,607 (D.S.C. 1795).
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1350 has not clearly delineated the meaning of and the relationship be-
tween the terms "tort" and "law of nations."' The cases interpreting sec-
tion 1350 have not fully analyzed the proper choice of law to establish
whether a tort has been committed,7 nor have these cases determined how
the doctrine of forum non conveniens should be applied to section 1350
claims.8
Section 1350 does not create a federal cause of action, 9 but grants ju-
risdiction to the federal district courts over a special category of tort
claims.10 Whether or not the acts alleged constitute a tort will be decided
according to the law selected by the applicable choice of law principles.
1
The basis for federal jurisdiction is a violation of customary international
law or a United States treaty. 2 Section 1350 subject matter jurisdiction is
properly established when the plaintiff, an alien, presents a colorable tort
claim, so long as the commission of the tort involved a violation of cus-
tomary international law or a United States treaty.13
A section 1350 analysis in which the tort and the international viola-
tion are separately considered, is consistent with the three reported deci-
sions in which a court retained jurisdiction over a section 1350 claim." In
See also O'Reilly De Camara v. Brooke, 209 U.S. 45 (1908) (unlawful confiscation of alien
property by a United States officer may be within the scope of § 1350 predecessor); Nguyen
Da Yen v. Kissinger, 528 F.2d 1194, 1201 n.13 (9th Cir. 1975) (wrongful retention of custody
of Vietnamese children may be tort in violation of law of nations); 26 Op. Att'y Gen. 250
(1907) (§ 1350 predecessor provides United States forum for Mexicans harmed by American
company's diversion of the Rio Grande in violation of a treaty).
0 See text accompanying notes 32-37, 46, & 66-69 infra.
See text accompanying notes 84-92 infra.
8 See text acompanying notes 93-99 infra.
8 Dreyfus v. Von Finck, 534 F.2d 24, 28 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 835 (1976).
10 See, e.g., Huynh Thi Anh v. Levi, 586 F.2d 625 (6th Cir. 1978). See also text accom-
panying notes 15-31 infra. The Levi court assumed that the custody of Vietnamese children
by American foster parents could be of a tortious character and examined Michigan,
Vietnamese, and international law to determine if that custody was actually wrongful.
1 The usual choice of law rule mandates that the law of the place of the wrong be
applied, but the law of the forum and international law are also possible choices. See text
accompanying notes 84-92 infra. Other possible choices includethe law of the domicile or
nationality of any of the parties and in maritime cases, the law of the flag. See Lauritzen v.
Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 584, 586-87 (1952).
12 Section 1350 is an example of a statute basing federal jurisdiction on the existence of
a federal question. Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 549 n.17 (1972).
I3 See text accompanying notes 37-54 infra.
' In analyzing § 1350 claims, some cases have not distinquished the requirement of a
tort from the requirement of an international violation. The exact holding of these cases is
difficult to determine. See, e.g., O'Reilly De Camara v. Brooke, 209 U.S. 45 (1908) (actions
of United States officer not tort or not violation of the law of nations if ratified by legislative
and executive branches); Pauling v. McElroy, 164 F. Supp. 390 (D.D.C. 1958), aff'd, 278 F.2d
252 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 835 (1960) (nuclear testing not tort or not violation of
international law). As this article went to print, the Second Circuit handed down its decision
in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). The Second Circuit found that allega-
tions of wrongful death by torture established a violation of the international law of human
rights and could invoke § 1350 jurisdiction. Id. at 884. The court's opinion deals mainly with
the issue of whether torture is proscribed by international custom, but the opinion also
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Bochos v. Darrel,15 decided in 1795, a French ship took a Spanish ship as
prize and brought it into a South Carolina port.16 Several slaves captured
with the prize ship belonged to a Spaniard, but were mortgaged to a Brit-
ish citizen.17 An agent of the British mortgagee seized the slaves in South
Carolina.18 The French captor brought suit for their return in the District
Court of South Carolina.19 The court held that its subject matter jurisdic-
tion was founded in admiralty or, in the alternative, on the 1789 prede-
cessor of section 1350.20 The French plaintiff asserted a violation of a
treaty between France and the United States.21 According to the treaty,
property found on board a vessel of an enemy of either the United States
or France was forfeit to the captor, even if the property belonged to a
neutral.22 The treaty provided the proper rule for determination of own-
ership, and domestic law apparently established the existence of a tor-
tious taking.2 s The court's reasoning suggests that federal jurisdiction was
based on the ownership rules provided by the treaty, while the relief was
granted for a tort under domestic law, not international or treaty law.
Separate analyses of the tort and international law violation were
made in Abdul-Rahman Omar Adra v. Clift24 to support its finding of
section 1350 jurisdiction. The defendant, an Iraqi citizen, was the former
wife of the Lebanese plaintiff.25 The plaintiff brought suit in the Mary-
land District Court for custody of his daughter, also a Lebanese na-
tional.26 Relying on American tort principles, the court reasoned that the
mother's retention of custody of the daughter was a tortious act, if she
concludes that Paraguayan law might be the proper law to decide the substantive merits of
the alleged tort on remand in the district court. Id. at 889. The court's opinion shows a clear
perception that allegations of an international violation and a tort require separate analyses
in a § 1350 case.
3 F. Cas. No. 1,607, p. 810 (D.S.C. 1795).




10 Id. See note 3 supra.
Iz The Bochos court did not cite the treaty it relied on, but the court was referring to
Article 14 of the Treaty of Amity and Commerce, February 6, 1778, United States-France, 8
Stat. 20, anulled July 7, 1798, 1 Stat. 578 ch. 67.
21 3 F. Cas. No. 1,607 at 811. The treaty between France and the United States relied
on by the Bolchos court reversed the usual international custom which protected the prop-
erty of friendly nationals found aboard enemy vessels taken prize. Id. The Boichos court did
not state when the ship was taken prize, but France was at war with both England and
Spain from early 1793 through 1795 when the case was decided. Since the mortgagee and
mortgagor were British and Spanish respectively, it is difficult to see how either could be a
neutral with respect to the French captor. If neither was neutral, then the French plaintiff
should have won under either the treaty or the international custom.
23 The Bolchos court did not discuss any choice of law issues, but may have assumed
that the seizure of the slaves was tortious. Presumably the court was relying on its under-
standing of South Carolina law to hold the seizure tortious. Id.
2' 195 F. Supp. 857 (D. Md. 1961).
21 Id. at 859.
26 Id.
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was not the parent entitled to custody. 7 The Adra court concluded that
her action was wrongful, because the father was entitled to custody under
Lebanese law.28 The retention of custody by the mother did not violate
any substantive provision of international or treaty law.29 Nevertheless,
because she had obtained and used an Iraqi passport which concealed her
child's name and nationality, the court found that the mother had vio-
lated international law. 0 The court held that the tortious retention of
custody and the improper use of the passport established federal jurisdic-
tion under section 1350.1
If the tort and the international violation are to be analyzed sepa-
rately, a determination of the proper relationship between the two is also
necessary. According to the wording of section 1350, the relationship be-
tween the international violation and the tort is that the tort must be
"committed" in violation of international law. 2 The Adra court found
that relationship satisfied where the violation of international law was the
means by which the tort was committed.32 The passport falsifications
were the means by which the mother evaded the father and kept custody
of the child. 4 In Bolchos, the relationship was more direct, because the
treaty established ownership for the purpose of determining that the
seizure of the slaves was wrongful8 5 The case law has not explored all
possible relationships which might satisfy the requirement of section 1350
that the tort be "committed" in violation of international law. Bolchos
and Adra suggest that section 1350 merely requires the existence of a
substantial connection between the two elements.
86
27 Id. at 862 (citing W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 103 (2nd ed. 1955);
RESTATEMENT op TORTS § 700 (1934)). The Adra court noted that although the plaintiff
sought injunctive relief and not damages, the act could be considered a tort. 195 F. Supp. at
863.
28 195 F. Supp. at 863. Lebanese and Moslem law entitled the male parent to custody of
a daughter when she reached nine years of age. Id. at 860.
" See id. at 862-63.
30 Id. at 864. The Adra court stated that the passport violations were made wrongful
not only by international law, but by United States and Lebanese law as well. Id. at 861,
864-65. The court cited no direct authority for the proposition that an individual's misuse of
a passport violates the law of nations. Probably it does not. The point, however, is that the
court treated the international law question separately from the tort question. As the court
recognized, in some circumstances individuals can violate the law of nations. See note 58
infra.
31 195 F. Supp. at 862-65.
22 See note 1 supra.
195 F. Supp. at 864-65.
3, Id. at 861-62.
31 See text accompanying note 23 supra.
28 An opinion of the Attorney General contended that § 1350 jurisdiction could be in-
voked against an American company which diverted the channel of the Rio Grande. The
diversion was prohibited by a treaty with Mexico and caused injury to Mexican citizens.
The broad language of the Attorney General's opinion may indicate that a violation of a
treaty by a private party can establish both the international violation and the tort required
by § 1350, if injury is caused by the violation. The treaty violation becomes an element
ALIEN TORT, CLAMS ACT
To properly analyze a section 1350 claim a court must inquire whether
a tort occurred and also whether a violation of the law of nations or a
United States treaty occurred in the commission of the tort. As used in
section 1350, "law of nations" means customary international law."7 Inter-
national customs are created when nations suscribe to particular usages
or practices" in the belief that their adherence to such usages or practices
is obligatory. 9 The actions of nations are both the source of and strongest
evidence for the existence of a particular international custom.' 0 Official
statements and assertions of governments may also evidence customs, 1 as
may the decisions of municipal and international courts,42 and the writ-
ings of publicists and commentators.43 Treaties, especially multilateral
constituting the tort. See 26 Op. Att'y Gen. 250 (1907). See also Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630
F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). (decided as this article went to print) (wrongful death by torture
violates international law). Filartiga suggests that the tortious act may not only be substan-
tially connected to the international violation, but may actually be the international viola-
tion. See note 75 infra.
37 Lopes v. Reederei Richard Schroeder, 225 F. Supp. 292 (E.D. Pa. 1963). The Lopes
court held that negligence and unseaworthiness causing njury to a sailor do not violate the
law of nations in a § 1350 claim. Id. at 295, 297. The court stated that a § 1350 violation of
the law of nations occurs when individuals violate a custom affecting the relationship be-
tween states or between an individual and a state, if the custom is used by states for their
common good or for dealings among themselves. Id. at 297. See also Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,
630 F.2d 876, 888, (2d Cir. 1980).
" See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900). The Paquete Habana Court found
that the immunity of fishing vessels was an ancient usage among civilized nations which
gradually ripened into a rule of international law. Id. at 695-96. A nation is not bound by a
custom if during the process of the custom's formation, that nation objects to the recogni-
tion of the practice as law. See, e.g., Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case, [1951] I.C.J. 116, 131
(customary rule inapplicable to Norway which always opposed it). Article 38 of the Statute
of the International Court of Justice authorizes the Court to apply "international custom as
evidence of a practice accepted as law," but it is arguable that the practices of nations are
properly evidence of custom. The distinction may only be a matter of semantics substituting
the word 'custom' for the word 'practice'. See C. PARRY, THE SOURCS AND EVIDENCES OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 56 (1965) [hereinafter cited as PARRY].
39 See, e.g., Case Concerning Right of Passage Over Indian Territory (Merits), [1960]
I.C.J. 6. Portugal argued that Great Britain and India had always agreed to the passage of
Portuguese armed forces over Indian territory and that a custom was formed thereby. The
International Court disagreed because nothing in the record indicated that Great Britain or
India treated the grant of permission as obligatory. Id. at 40-41. See also North Sea Conti-
nental Shelf Cases, [1969] LC.J. 3, 44-45; Case Concerning Right of Passage over Indian
Territory (Merits) [1960] I.C.J. 6, 42-43. Diplomatic ceremonies and protocol are usually
based on custom, but do not create legal norms because the customs are adhered to as a
courtesy, not from a sense of legal duty. See North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, [1969]
I.C.J. 3, 44.
40 M. AKEHURST, A MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 32 (3d ed. 1971)
[hereinafter cited as AKEHURST]; PARRY, supra note 38, at 62-65. Only action or inaction of
states can create practice. Practice in turn creates customary international rules when the
actions are done with the conviction of obligation. PARRY, supra note 38, at 63-64.
41 AKEHURST, supra note 40, at 32.
41 A. SHEIKH, INTERNATIONAL LAw AND NATIONAL BEHAVIOUR 66-67 (1974) [hereinafter
cited as SHEIKH].
43 AKEHURST, supra note 40, at 32; SHEIKH, supra note 42, at 67-68. Other evidences or
12671980]
1268 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
treaties and conventions, and agreements promulgated through interna-
tional organizations are sometimes declarative of pre-existing interna-
tional custom or serve as the source of a rule which passes into custom."
The normal usage of the term "law of nations" includes both treaty
law and customary international law.46 Since section 1350 places the
terms "law of nations" and "treaties of the United States" in the disjunc-
tive, the statute's use of the term "law of nations" excludes treaty law."
Instead, section 1350 makes express provision for jurisdiction in the case
of the violation of a United States treaty.47 Because of this express provi-
sion, section 1350 implicitly rejects the use of treaties to which the United
States is not a party.'8 Case law has not established whether international
agreements to which the United States is a party, but which cannot be
characterized as treaties in the Constitutional sense,49 should be given the
same effect as a treaty for the purpose of establishing section 1350 juris-
diction. 0 Such agreements, however, should be given effect to the extent
that they, have the same municipal legal force as a treaty would.
51
Because section 1350 rejects the use of international agreements to
which the United States is not a party, the statute reflects a policy of
founding jurisdiction only upon violations of international law that is
sources of custom include digests of international and state practice, codifications of cus-
tomary law in treaties, acts of international organizations, and general principles of law.
AKEHURST, supra note 40, at 39-45; PARRY, supra note 38, at 67-91; SHEIKH, supra note 42,
at 68-69.
" AKEHURST, supra note 40, at 33.
" The usual use of the term 'law of nations' or international law includes treaties as a
basic source of law. See SHmKH, supra note 42, at 62-66.
" See note 1 supra. Because § 1350 mentions both the law of nations and United
States treaties in the disjunctive, it follows that under § 1350 treaties are not a part of the
law of nations. The only treaties mentioned by § 1350 are United States treaties. See note 1
supra. Therefore no treaty or international agreement may be a basis for § 1350 jurisdiction
unless the United States is a party.
'7 See note 1 supra. The violation of a United States treaty formed the basis for § 1350
jurisdiction in Bolchos v. Darrel, 3 F. Cas. No. 1,607, p. 810 (1795).
" See notes 1 & 46 supra.
49 A treaty in the Constitutional sense is a treaty entered into by the President with the
advice and consent of two-thirds of the Senate. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
50 See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957). In Reid an executive agreement in effect be-
tween Great Britain and the United States was held subject to Constitutional guarantees.
Id. at 15-19. Executive agreements are international agreements made by the President
without the advice and consent of the Senate. See generally Lissitzyn, THE LEGAL STATUS
OF ExECUTivE AGREEMENTS ON AIR TRANSPORTATION, 17 J. AIR L. & CoM. 436, 438-44 (1950).
Congressional-executive agreements are made by the President as authorized or approved
by both houses of Congress. See HENKIN, supra note 3, at 173-76.
"l An executive agreement may have the same legal force as a treaty, see, e.g., United
States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942), if the President is acting within the powers granted him
by the Constitution. Such powers include those of the commander in chief, nomination of
ambassadors and consuls, etc. These powers are construed broadly to provide a basis for the
making of executive agreements. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES § 121 (1965) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT]. See also RESTATEMENT,
supra, §§ 119, 120.
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binding on the United States.52 If this is the policy of section 1350, then
international customs which are not binding on the United States should
not form the basis of section 1350 jurisdiction. Such non-binding customs
would include regional customs outside North America" and customs to
which the United States has consistently objected.5 4 The result is that
section 1350 jurisdiction should be founded only upon violations of cus-
toms or international agreements with the municipal legal force of a
treaty to which the United States is a party. Therefore, in adjudicating
section 1350 claims, the federal district courts should be concerned only
with international law in which the United States has a direct interest.
When the original version of section 1350 was passed the theoretical
underpinnings of international law were different from those underlying
modern international law.5 5 The theory most familiar to the First Con-
gress was the natural law theory which postulated that individuals, as
well as nations, are endowed by nature with inherent rights.56 Section
1350 is consistent with natural law theory because the statute contem-
plates the right of an individual to enforce international law in the dis-
trict courts.57 Recent international developments in the field of human
rights indicate that natural law theory may still have some validity,58 but
5, In some circumstances a treaty to which the United States is not a party may be
binding upon the United States. If a treaty has become the source of a custom, if a third
party nation has accepted obligations in a treaty, or if a treaty is accorded a legislative effect
by consent of the international community, it may be binding on nonparties. See generally
Case of the Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex, [1932] P.C.I.J., ser. A/B, No.
46; BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIoNs 326-27 (6th ed. 1963).
5- Regional customs are customary legal norms binding a geographic region, rather than
the entire international community. Similarly, local customs are those which arise from con-
tinued practice between a few nations. See generally Case Concerning Right of Passage
Over Indian Territory (Merits), [1960] I.C.J. 6, 39-43.
" A nation can "opt out" of an international custom by objecting to it during its forma-
tion. See Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case, [1951] I.C.J. 116, 131.
85 See generally Note, The Law of Nations in. the District Courts: Federal Jurisdiction
Over Tort Claims by Aliens Under 28 U.S.C. § 1350, 1 B.C. INT'L & CoMp. L.J. 71 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Tort Claims by Aliens].
88 Natural law theory found expression in the self-evident truths and inalienable rights
of the Declaration of Independence. Natural law theory sought to derive legal norms from
basic metaphysical theory. See J. JoNEs, HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE THEORY OF LAW
104-06, 108-10, 118-19 (reprinted 1969). Natural law theory was based on the belief that
universally acceptable principles of right and wrong were inherent in the nature of things.
Tort Claims by Aliens, supra note 55, at 73.
87 Tort Claims by Aliens, supra note 55, at 88.
88 E.g., Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12,
1949, entered into force Oct. 21, 1950, 6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 135;
Charter of the International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg) (Agreement for the Prosecution
and Punishment of Major War Criminals of the European Axis) signed Aug. 8, 1948, 59
Stat. 1546; Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
adopted Dec. 9, 1948, entered into force Jan. 12, 1951, 78 U.N.T.S. 277; International Con-
venant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted Dec. 16, 1966, entered into force Mar. 23,
1976, G.A. Ras. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966); Declara-
tion on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel,
1980] 1269
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in most other areas of international law, positivism has superseded natu-
ral law theory.59 Because the thesis of postivism is that international law
pertains only to the relationships between nations and that individual
rights exist only derivatively through the agency of the individual's own
government, 0 positive law theory may conflict with the legislative intent
behind section 1350.
In Dreyfus v. Von Finck,61 the Second Circuit refused to exercise sec-
tion 1350 jurisdiction in part because the court espoused positive law the-
ory. In Dreyfus, a Swiss citizen brought suit in the Southern District of
New York against a West German citizen. 2 The Swiss plaintiff, a Jew,
alleged that he had been forced to sell his banking firm to the defendant
for inadequate consideration in 1938 in Nazi Germany. s The district
court did not find section 1350 jurisdiction and the Second Circuit af-
firmed, holding, in part, that the law of nations could not confer a private
right of action upon an individual.2 The Second Circuit, applying posi-
tive law theory, reasoned that customary international law deals only
with relationships among nations, not private parties, and therefore that
customary international law is not self-executing.6 5
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, adopted Dec. 19, 1975, G.A. RES. 3452, 30
U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 34) 91, U.N. Doc. A/1034 (1975). Such agreements and declarations
indicate a growing consensus that individuals have inalienable rights which should be recog-
nized by sovereign nations. Compare 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 362-
69 (2d Ed. 1912) with 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 636-42 (8th ed.
1955) (H. Lauterpacht's revision), reprinted in L. SOHN & T. BUERGENTHAL, INTERNATIONAL
PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 1-8 (1973). Oppenheim contended that the law of nations
concerns only nations and not individuals. The rights of individuals were guaranteed by
municipal law, with each nation responsible for conforming its municipal law to the require-
ments, of international law. Therefore, according to Oppenheim, individuals were not the
subject of international law, but the object of it. Id. at 3. Lauterpacht's revision of Oppen-
heim states that, in general, individuals are the object of international law, but that individ-
uals are also the direct subject of international law in an increasing number of situations
particularly in the field of human rights. Id. at 6. Torture has been held a violation of the
international law of human rights and a basis for § 1350 jurisdiction in the recently decided
case of Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
' Tort Claims by Aliens, supra note 55, at 77.
60 See id. at 77-78; M. KoRowIz, INTRODUCTION To INTERNATIONAL LAW 51 (1959).
e' 534 F.2d 24 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 825 (1976).
61 Id. at 26.
03 Id.
. Id. at 29-31. The Dreyfus court may have been influenced by a number of issues
which were not expressly ruled upon. The plaintiff had already been compensated under the
terms of a judicially approved settlement in 1951. Id. at 26. The delay of twenty years be-
tween the 1951 settlement and the bringing of a lawsuit in the United States could have
given rise to the defense of laches. Id. at 27 n.5. Because the plaintiff and defendant were
European citizens and the acts complained of occurred in Germany, the case could probably
have been dismissed on grounds of forum non conveniens. See text accompanying notes 94-
99 infra. Whether or not these issues actually had some influence on the Dreyfus holding is
only speculation, but may explain the court's weak reasoning. See text accompanying notes
66-69 & 82-83 infra.
;" Id. at 30-31; Tort Claims by Aliens, supra note 55, at 78. The Second Circuit over-
ruled Dreyfus v. Von Finch in part as this article went to print. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,
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An international legal norm is self-executing when it applies not only
between sovereign nations, but also in municipal law as a source of legal
rights enforceable by private parties.6 The Dreyfus court failed to realize
that section 1350 usually will not require the existence of a self-executing
custom or treaty to establish jurisdiction. Since the claim brought under
section 1350 is for a tort s 7 it is the tort which must be self-executing.
Municipal law gives individuals redress when torts are committed; there-
fore tort law is self-executing by definition.6 8 Self-execution will be an
issue only when the plaintiff cannot establish the existence of a tort
under any applicable municipal law, and therefore relies, solely on inter-
national law.69
If the plaintiff can demonstrate that an "international tort" has been
committed, section 1350 jurisdiction may be invoked because the same
facts will establish both the tort and the international violation required
by the statute.70 An international tort.might be based on either a treaty
or an international custom. For a tort to exist under a treaty, the treaty
must be self-executing to establish a private right to enforce the treaty's
provisions.7 1 Whether a treaty is self-executing is a matter of interpreta-
tion based on the intent of the parties, usually as discerned from the face
of the treaty documents.72 A tort may also exist under a treaty which is
not self-executing, but only if the treaty has been executed by municipal
630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). The Filartiga court characterized as erroneous dictum-the
Dreyfus statement that international law is not violated when the parties are nationals of
the acting state. Id. at 884. In Filartiga the Second Circuit held that the wrongful death of a
Paraguayan citizen by torture perpetrated by a Paraguayan police official in Paraguay vio-
lated the law of nations and supported § 1350 federal jurisdiction. Id. at 887.
" The issue of self-execution is not normally considered in the context of customary
international law; instead it is a part of the field of treaty interpretation. See RESTATEMENT,
supra note 51, § 154. Normally an international agreement which manifests an intention
that its provisions become effective without the passage of effectuating legislation will be
considered self-executing so as to create justiciable rights in private persons. See generally
id.
67 See text accompanying note 10 supra. Section 1350 jurisdiction may not be invoked
by a claim for the proceeds of a life insurance policy, because such a claim is a contract
action, not a tort. Valanga v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 324, 328 (D. Pa. 1966).
" See generally W. PROSSER, HANDaOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 1 (4th ed. 1971) [here-
inafter cited as PROSSER].
", See note 66 supra.
70 See note 36 supra.
7' Treaties normally have direct effect only upon states, not individuals. The express or
implied terms of a treaty, however, can impose duties or confer rights directly upon individ-
uals. L. OPPENHEIM, 1 INTERNATIONAL LAW § 520 (8th ed. 1955) [hereinafter cited as OPPEN-
'HPlM]; see Benjamins v. British European Airways, 572 F.2d 913, 916-19 (2d Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1114 (1979) (Warsaw Convention creates private right of action for air-
plane crash victims); Canadian Transport Co. v. United States, 430 F. Supp. 1168, 1171-72
(D.D.C. 1977) (Maritime Traffic Convention creates no private right of action for vessels
excluded from United States ports); Upper Lakes Shipping, Ltd. v. International Long-
shoreman's Ass'n, 33 F.R.D. 348, 350 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (sole private remedy under free pas-
sage treaty is express provision for private claims to International Joint Commission).
71 RESTATEMENT, supra note 51, § 154.
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legislation creating private enforcement rights.
73
Because international custom deals primarily with acts by states, the
acts of private parties will not normally be classified as tortious by inter-
national custom.7 ' No section 1350 cases have attempted to define a cus-
tomary international tort.75 In The Paquete Habana,7 6 however, the Su-
preme Court awarded damages to the owners of fishing vessels which had
been taken prize in violation of international custom.7 7 Customary inter-
national law forbade the seizure of unarmed coastal fishing vessels not
involved in the hostilities.
78
Although the case was brought under admiralty juridsiction rather
than section 1350,71 The Paquete Habana is relevant to section 1350 ac-
tions because the Court granted relief to individuals for a violation of
international custom. By implication, therefore, that custom can be con-
sidered self-executing.8 0 The wrongful seizure can be classified as a tort
because it is a "civil wrong, other than breach of contract" and may be
analogized to a wrongful taking or conversion under domestic tort law.81
The relief granted was in the nature of tort damages. Arguably then, in a
factual situation similar to that presented by The Paquete Habana, a
customary international tort exists for the purpose of section 1350 juris-
diction. It should be noted, however, that the responsible party in The
Paquete Habana was not a private individual, but the U.S. government.
The Second Circuit in Dreyfus did not consider The Paquete Habana
when it concluded that customary international law is not self-executing;
nor do the cases cited in Dreyfus support such a conclusion.8 2 Those cases
73 OPPENHEIM, supra note 71, § 520.
7' The International Law Commission's Draft Articles on State Responsibility, U.N.
Doc. A/34/194 (1979), 18 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1568 (1979), address internationally
wrongful acts of states, including torts. See id. art. 19. The draft articles illustrate the em-
phasis of custom on state action, but they do not necessarily rule out the development of
international tort law concerning the conduct of individuals.
" A case recently decided in the Second Circuit, Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876
(2d Cir. 1980), could be interpreted to establish the existence of a tort under international
law. The plaintiffs, relatives of the deceased, brought a wrongful death action for the torture
and murder of Joelito Filartiga by the defendant acting in his capacity as a police official in
Paraguay. Id. at 878. The court held that torture violates the international law of human
rights and that torture therefore could support § 1350 jurisdiction. Id. at 884. Since wrong-
ful death appears to be a tort under both the laws of Paraguay and New York, where the
action was brought, a more reasonable interpretation of Filartiga is that the alleged act of
torture was both a tort under municipal law and a violation of the law of nations. See also
note 58 supra.
76 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
7 Id. at 686, 714. Since both vessels had already been sold, the Court ordered compen-
satory damages. Id. at 714, 721.
78 Id. at 686. The Court discussed the development of this custom in detail. Id. at 686-
713.
71 Id. at 680-81.
80 See text accompanying note 66 supra.
8' See PRossER, supra note 68, at 2, 76-97.
2 See Valanga v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 324 (E.D. Pa. 1966) (no
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found that no violations of international law were presented by the facts.
For example, one of the cited cases held that neither unseaworthiness of a
vessel nor negligence causing injury to a crew member was proscribed by
any rule of customary international law and therefore that section 1350 .
jurisdiction could not be invoked."s
The First Congress did not specify what law should be applied to sec-
tion 1350 allegations to determine whether a tort has been committed."
This issue must be resolved according to applicable choice law princi-
ples.85 The possible choices in a section 1350 case include federal or state
law, the law of a foreign nation, or international law.86 Courts should find
guidance in the principles applicable to maritime or admiralty jurisdic-
tion. Maritime jurisdiction, like section 1350 jurisdiction, often involves
foreign parties, occurrences, and laws; and therefore maritime choice of
law rules have been developed to ensure international comity.87 The con-
siderations evaluated in maritime cases which are applicable to section
1350 claims include the nationalities and domiciles of the parties, the ex-
pectations of the parties, the place of the alleged occurrences, and the law
of the forum.88
violation of international law when American company refuses to pay insurance beneficiary
residing behind Iron Curtain); Pauling v. McElroy, 164 F. Supp. 390 (D.D.C. 1958), afl'd,
278 F.2d 252 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 835 (1960) (nuclear tests not violation of
international law).
'3Damaskinos v. Societa Navigacion InterAmericana, S.A. Pan., 255 F. Supp. 919
(S.D.N.Y. 1966). In Damaskinos a Greek seaman fell through an open hatch on a Liberian
ship owned by Greeks through a Panamanian company. The accident occurred off the New
Jersey coast. Id. at 922.
I The First Congress' use of the term "tort" probably does not conflict with the mod-
ern understanding of the term. The activities classified as tortious in 1789 are substantially
similar to those circumscribed by modern tort law. The eighteenth century tort law included
assault, battery, trespass vi et armis and on the case, slander and libel, false imprisonment,
trespass, nuisance, and damage to or taking of personal property. See W. BLACKSTONE, COM-
MENTARIES ON THE LAW, passim at Book 11. All of these torts are still recognized in modern
tort law in one form or another. See PROSS ER, supra note 68, passim. Trespass vi et armis
and on the case were precursors of negligence. See Gregory, Trepass to Negligence to Abso-
lute Liability, 37 VA. L. REv. 359, 363-67 (1951). Blackstone's COMMENTARIES have particu-
lar significance for § 1350 since the chief draftsman of the Judiciary Act of 1789, which
included § 1350's original version, is known to have relied on the COMMENTARIES to defend
the Judiciary bill in the Senate debates. W. MACLAY, SKETCHES OF DEBATES IN THE FIRST
SENATE 90-92 (1880, reprinted 1969). The COMMENTARIES may serve as a source of legislative
history for § 1350 in the absence of direct legislative history for the statute. The COMMENTA-
RIES were the most authoritative general legal authority in American in 1789. See D.
LOCKMILLER, SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE 169-83 (1970).
8" Where the Congress does not specify the jurisdictional limitations of a statute, the
courts will apply conflict of laws reasoning to determine the territorial reach of the statute.
See Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 576-79 & 579 n.7 (1953).
86 See note 11 supra.
87 Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 581-82 (1953). In a recently decided case the Sec-
ond Circuit has recommended the application of the Lauritzen choice of law analysis to §
1350 cases. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 889 (2d Cir. 1950); note 100 infra.
" See Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 583-91 (1953); note 100 infra.
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The law of the place of the wrong is the usual choice of law in tort
cases.8 The law of the forum, however, may be applied to acts occurring
outside the forum where strong policies of and contacts with the forum
are involved. 0 For instance, the interest of a state in its resident children
is so strong that it may apply its own law to determine custody, rather
than that of a foreign nation from which the child allegedly has been
taken wrongfully.9 1
The initial choice of law issue in a section 1350 case is which jurisdic-
tion's laws should define the tort. The determination of this issue, how-
ever, only resolves the question of the district court's jurisdiction over the
claim. The same choice of law need not be selected for the merits of the
claim or the suitability of the relief sought, because the choice of law con-
siderations may differ when the outcome of the case, rather than the loca-
tion of the litigation, is being determined.
9 2
Choice of law issues are also significant to the doctrine of forum non
conveniens because the difficulty of ascertaining and applying foreign law
is a consideration in the forum non conveniens analysis.9 3 The doctrine of
forum non conveniens permits a court to refuse the exercise of its prop-
erly invoked jurisdiction under certain conditions.9 ' The court will evalu-
ate such considerations as the hardships imposed on the parties by reason
of the forum selected, the availability of witnesses and evidence in the
9 See RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 378 (1934); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 6, 145, 146 (1971) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CON-
FLICTS]. Under the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICTS the relative interests and policies of
the forum are balanced against the expectations of the parties, as well as the interests and
policies of the state or nation where the tort took place. The law of the place where the tort
occured is the preferred law unless the analysis of competing interests directs otherwise. See
generally Reese, Choice of Law in Torts and Contracts and Directions for the Future, 16
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1 (1977).
9 See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 885 (2d Cir. 1980); Reese, D~pecage: A
Common Phenomenon In Choice of Law, 73 COLUM L. REV. 58, 60-63 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as Reese].
9' Huynh Thi Anh v. Levi, 586 F.2d 625, 630 (6th Cir. 1978); Abdul-Rahman Omar
Adra v. Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857, 866-67 (D. Md. 1961).
11 The application of the rules of different jurisdictions to resolve different issues in the
same case is called d~peqage. See Reese, supra note 90, at 58-59. The considerations which
determine whether d6pegage should be applied in a case include applying the rule of the
jurisdiction with the greatest interest in each issue, effectuating the purposes of each rule
applied, and serving the expectations of the parties. Id. at 60. In Abdul-Rahman Omar Adra
v. Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857 (D. Md. 1961), a federal court relied on Lebanese law to hold that
a mother had committed a tort which invoked § 1350 jurisdiction. Id. at 862-63. But the
court applied the law of the child's domicile, Michigan, to hold that the child should remain
with the mother and that the father was not entitled to the remedy of regaining custody of
the child. Id. at 866-67. In a § 1350 case even the violation of non-self-executing interna-
tional rules can invoke federal jurisdiction where municipal law may be applied to deter-
mine the substantive merits of the case. E.g., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir.
1980) (decided as this article went to print).
" See, e.g., PapaGeorgiou v. Lloyds of London, 436 F. Supp. 701, 703 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
94 See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 507 (1947).
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forum selected, and the court's ability to enforce its judgment.9 5
The application of forum non conveniens to section 1350 cases should
be similar to its admiralty application. In Papa Georgiou v. Lloyds of
London,96 a district court refused to exercise admiralty jurisdiction over a
tort claim on forum non conveniens grounds.97 The court noted that all
the events had occurred in Greece, all nonparty affiants were nonresi-
dents of the United States," no relevant evidence existed in the United
States, and translations of Greek court proceedings differed depending on
the party offering the translation. The court also found that because
choice of law principles directed application of Greek law,100 the difficulty
of ascertaining that law supported forum non conveniens dismissal.201
The same considerations of international comity, judicial economy, and
convenience of the parties should apply to forum non conveniens deci-
sions in section 1350 cases.
Often an alien will bring a section .1350 tort claim in a district court
because personal jurisdiction over the defendant is obtainable only in the
United States. When the tort involves a violation of customary interna-
tional law or an international agreement of the United States, federal ju-
risdiction is appropriate because of the federal interest in foreign'af-
fairs.102 To ensure the exercise of federal judicial power where Congress
has authorized its exercise, district courts should insulate the analysis of
" Id. at 508. The ability of a federal court to enforce its judgment in a § 1350 tort claim
will not ordinarily be at issue. The defendant must be present in the forum, have assets in
the forum, or establish some other form of minimum contacts resulting in personal jurisdic-
tion over the defendant which will enable the court to enforce its judgment. See Interna-
tional Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945). If the defendant flees beyond the
court's jurisdiction and leaves no assets in reach of the forum, the court may properly con-
sider its ability to enforce its judgment in an analysis of forum non conveniens.
"436 F. Supp. 701 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
The PapaGeorgiou plaintiffs alleged the existence of subject matter jurisdiction
under § 1350, but because the district court found that it had admiralty jurisdiction, it did
not rule on the allegation of § 1350 jurisdiction. Id. at 702.
93 Id. at 701-02. The plaintiffs were Greek citizens and became residents of the United
States after the torts allegedly occurred. Id. at 703.
" Id. at 702-03.
zoo The PapaGeorgiou court followed the choice-of-law analysis found in Lauritzen v.
Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953). Lauritzen held that, although the usual choice of law in mari-
time jurisdiction is the law of the flag, seven considerations should be evaluated in choosing
the proper law- the place of the wrongful act, the law of the flag, the national allegiance or
domicile of the plaintiff, the national allegiance of the ship owner, the place of the contract,
if any, the accessibility of a foreign forum, and the law of the forum itself. See also
Tjonaman v. A/S Glittre, 340 F.2d 290 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 925 (1965); note 87
infra. These considerations overlap the considerations utilized in evaluating the applicabil-
ity of the doctrine of forum non conveniens. See text accompaning note 95 supra.
1*1 436 F. Supp. at 703-04.
102 See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980) (decided as this article
went to print). In Filartiga the Second Circuit stated that the foreign relations implications
of a § 1350 case underscore "the wisdom of the First Congress in vesting jurisdiction of [§
1350] claims in the federal courts ... [because such cases] are fraught with implications for
the nation as a whole. . . . "Id.
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the technical requirements of section 1350 from their uneasiness with in-
ternational affairs. A plaintiff can invoke section 1350 jurisdiction if he
alleges the commission of a tort under a properly chosen law and if that
tort is substantially connected to a violation of international law. Once
invoked, section 1350 jurisdiction should be exercised unless the existence
of a more suitable forum leads to a forum non conveniens dismissal.
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